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This paper focuses on the corporate governance (CG) arrangements of Institutions 
offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) aimed at protecting stakeholders’ financial 
interests. Many IIFS CG issues are common with those of their conventional 
counterparts. Others are distinctive.  In particular they offer unrestricted investment 
accounts that share risks with shareholders but without a voting right. This paper first 
reviews internal and external arrangements put in place by IIFS to protect stakeholders’ 
financial interests. It discusses shortcomings notably in terms of potential conflict of 
interest between shareholders and holders of unrestricted investment accounts. It then 
suggests a CG framework that combines internal and external arrangements to provide 
safeguards to unrestricted investment account holders without overburdening IIFS’ 
financial performance. The paper uses a review of 13 IIFS and regulatory information 
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CAH:         Current Account Holders 
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CFICFB:    Cooperative Financial Institutions Businesses  
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CIBAFI:    General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions  
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IIFM:         International Islamic Financial Market  
IIFS:          Institutions offering Islamic Financial Services 
IIRA:         International Islamic Rating Agency 
IRR:           Investment Risk Reserve 
IOSCO:     The International Organization of Securities Commissions 
LMC:         Liquidity Management Center 
OECD:       Organization for Economic Cooperation in Europe 
PER:          Profit Equalization Reserve 
PLS:           Profit and Loss Sharing  
PQBC:        Publicly Quoted Corporation Bank 
RIA:           Restricted Investment Account 
RIAH:        Restricted Investment Accounts Holders 
SME:          Small and Medium Enterprise 
SSB:           Shariah Supervisory Board 
UIA:           Unrestricted investment account 




  After a long period of lull since the Middle Ages, there has been a large and 
growing interest in Islamic finance in the last three decades, particularly following the 
first oil price shock of 1973-74. Beyond the surge in liquidity, other major factors have 
been the introduction of innovative Islamic financial products and a demand by Muslim 
populations for financial services compatible with their religious beliefs. More recently, a 
new impetus has been provided by the uneven performance of western financial markets, 
a perception of increased risk for Gulf Cooperation Council capital in traditional financial 
markets, and the development of managerial skills in Islamic financial services.
2  The 
global Islamic financial services industry now includes 284 institutions offering Islamic 
financial services (IIFS) in 38 countries, both Muslim and non-Muslim.
3  
 
  Initially, IIFS developed without a clear view on the legislative and regulatory 
framework that should apply to them.
4 However, their conceptual foundations and 
operational practices have specific features that pose challenges to regulators and call for 
solutions beyond the simple extension of existing legislation and regulation applying to 
businesses offering conventional financial services (BCFS). To that effect, a number of 
countries have put in place laws and regulations for IIFS, and international bodies have 
been established to adapt conventional standards and promote harmonization of 
practices.
5 
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Arun Adarkar, Stijn Claessens, Dahlia El-Hawary, Zamir Iqbal, Luigi 
Passamonti, Leila Triki, and participants to meetings of the Islamic Financial Services Board and the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Services for helpful comments on the issues 
discussed.  All remaining errors are the authors’. 
2 According to the General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI), total assets have 
roughly doubled in the period 1998-2001, soaring from $134 to 261 Billion. Source: 
http://www.islamicfi.com (last visited April 04, 2005). 
3 The term IIFS includes finance houses, that offer retail commercial and investment services. The paper 
does not deal with Takaful  (insurance) companies. These figures were reported in a press release by 
CIBAFI dated May 8, 2005, (“CIBAFI Raises the Glance toward IFSI Growth with a Unique Statistic-
Based 10-Year Strategic Plan”).   
4 For example, in some cases the general prudential regime was extended to IIFS without recognizing any 
specific feature.  In other cases, IIFS registered as non-bank commercial businesses. For an introduction to 
the principles and instruments of Islamic finance as well as regulatory arrangements applying to IIFS, refer 
to El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2004). 
5 These include the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the International 2 
 
 
Good governance is crucial to the ability of a business to protect the interests of 
its stakeholders. These interests may extend beyond the purely financial to the 
stakeholders’ ethical, religious, or other beliefs. In the case of an institution offering 
Islamic financial services, its operations are required to be carried out in compliance with 
the principles of Shariah (Islamic Law). A corporate structure that enables a financial 
institution to implement good governance through Shariah-compliant operations  is 
therefore essential for the stability and efficiency of Islamic financial services.
6 
 
The practices of IIFS raise specific corporate governance (CG) challenges. While 
a number of problems are common to all financial institutions, two broad sets of CG 
issues are specific to IIFS. The first one arises from the need to reassure stakeholders that 
IIFS activities fully comply with the precepts of Islamic jurisprudence.
7 Ultimately, the 
core mission of such an institution is to meet its stakeholders’ desire to conduct their 
financial business according to Shariah principles. The same stakeholders also need to be 
assured that the firm will nonetheless actively promote their financial interest, and prove 
to be an efficient, stable and trustworthy provider of financial services. This combination 
of Shariah compliance and business performance raises specific challenges and agency 
problems, and underlines the need for distinctive CG structures. This paper focuses on 
CG arrangements aimed at protecting stakeholders’ financial interests.
8 
 
Given that the core mission of an Islamic financial institution is to enable its 
stakeholders to pursue their financial interests without breaching their religious beliefs, 
the CG arrangements for IIFS cannot underestimate the importance of having a 
framework that credibly protects these financial interests. Mission statements appear to 
identify four categories of stakeholders: shareholders, “depositors”, “borrowers” and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the Liquidity Management Center (LMC). Rather than seeking to 
replace existing regulation, these bodies propose solutions whenever conventional regulation fails to 
address the distinctiveness of the Islamic financial industry. 
6 Annex I provides a glossary of Arabic terms. 
7 Islamic jurisprudence is also known as Fiqh. It covers all aspects of life: religious, political, social and 
economic. It is mainly based on interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna (saying and deeds of the prophet).  
8 For an overview paper of CG of IIFS, see Grais and Pellegrini (2006a).  Grais and Pellegrini (2006b) 




socially vulnerable groups. Internal CG mechanisms should be designed to ensure that 
the interests of all these stakeholders’ are looked after. Broader institutional 
arrangements, or external mechanisms, would complement internal arrangements and 
enhance their effectiveness.  
 
Section A of this paper reviews  prevailing internal and external CG arrangements 
to protect stakeholders’ financial interests in IIFS and identifies shortcomings. Section B 
suggests measures to overcome these shortcomings. 
 
A. Protecting Stakeholders’ Financial Interests: Current 
Practice and Shortcomings 
1. Internal  Arrangements 
 
IIFS generally put in place CG structure and systems similar to those of BCFS to 
handle traditional agency problems between shareholders and management. Although not 
specific to IIFS, the protection of small shareholders may be equally important for them. 
Indeed, concentrated ownership and control may be more widespread in IIFS than with 
BCFS. Table I shows that out of a sample of 21 IIFS for which shareholder information 
was exhaustive, 9 appear to be family owned and controlled, about 43% of the sample.
9 
This translates into a concentration of control of executive decisions and a monolithic 
board of directors that may be biased in favor of specific interests, unless adequately 
checked. Small shareholders as well as other stakeholders may accordingly be at risk. For 
example, management may use discretion in the funds they commingle to finance 
specific investments and provide better yields to dominant shareholders.
10 
                                                 
9 Data were collected through IIFS websites as well as the Bankscope and Capital Intelligence databases. 
Control is defined as effective control power over the enterprise. Further research may want to analyze 
more rigorously ownership structure differences between IIFS and BCFS. In particular, research may want 
to explore the ratio of independent directors to all directors in IIFS to verify whether family ownership 
effectively leads to episodes of board capture. 
10 Paradoxically, family ownership in non-financial firms may solve the problems deriving from Bearle and 
Means’ (1932) separation of ownership from control. However, in financial firms, where substantial funds 
are contributed by depositors and not equity holders, this type of ownership worsens the position of non-
shareholder stakeholders. Given the importance attached by IIFS to stakeholders, this represents a relevant 




Table I - Ownership structure of IIFS 
  Family Owned  State Owned  Dispersed 
ownership 
Total sample 
Number  9 5 7  21 
%  43 24 33  100 
 
Public ownership is also a frequent feature of IIFS (Table I).
11 This raises the 
issue of contingent liability for public finances and the protection of the ultimate 
shareholder, the public at large. It also points to the need to pay attention to CG features 
that would provide management with enough leeway to operate at arms length from 
public authorities. Nonetheless, these CG issues are not specific to IIFS, and   
conventional approaches can be helpful to IIFS in addressing them. 
 
Next to shareholders, depositors are a second category of IIFS’ stakeholders. 
Generally, IIFS offer three broad categories of deposit accounts: current, restricted 
investment and unrestricted investment.
12 Each category raises some CG issues, but those 
of unrestricted investment account holders (UIAH) may be the most challenging. Current 
and restricted accounts are briefly considered before turning to UIAH.  
 
Current accounts (CA) in Islamic finance may take three general forms depending 
on national jurisdictions. In Amana deposits, the financial institution acts as a trustee and 
promises to pay back the deposit in full. An example is the Jordan Islamic bank that 
offers “trust deposits”. As the bank’s terms and conditions state, “the bank may use such 
deposits at its own risk and responsibility in respect of profit and loss as these accounts 
do not share in investment risks and consequently do not share in investment profit or 
losses”. Likewise, in a qard hassan, goodwill loan, the bank receives a loan from 
                                                 
11 The survey shows that 24% of IIFS are fully state controlled (i.e. the state is the ultimate controller 
through golden shares of majority ownership). However, state ownership rises to 57% when one includes 
partial state ownership (without ultimate control). 
12 Most IIFS also offer savings accounts. However, they usually fall in either the category of term 
investments or in that of current accounts. We therefore only distinguish between investment deposits and 
current account deposits. 5 
 
 
depositors and owes them only the principal amount. “Iran’s Law for Usury (Interest) 
Free Banking” stipulates “banks are obliged to repay the principals of “gharz-al-
hasaneh” (saving and current) deposits”.
13  Last, Wadiah current accounts are also based 
on principal amount guarantees.  For instance, Bank Muamalat states that “the bank 
guarantees the value of the deposit thus creating a Wadiah Yad-Dhamanah contract”. In 
all cases, the financial institution obtains an implicit or explicit authorization to use the 
deposit money for whatever purpose permitted by Shariah, but pay no fixed interest or 
profit shares to the depositors, with the exception of gifts (hiba) distributed at the bank’s 
discretion.
14 Given the similarities with conventional checking accounts, Islamic current 
accounts do not pose CG issues specific to IIFS.  
 
In the case of restricted investment accounts (RIA), the bank acts only as fund 
manager -- agent or non-participating Mudarib -- and is not authorized to mix its own 
funds with those of investors without their prior permission. The IIFS operate these 
accounts under the principle of Mudaraba and tailor modes of investments as well as 
profit distribution to the risk appetite and needs of the individual clients. Funds provided 
by restricted investment account (RIA) holders are off balance-sheet. The relevant 
information about such accounts is provided in the statement of changes in restricted 
investments and their equivalent, or as a footnote to the statement of financial position, a 
treatment similar to that for funds’ management in BCFS. This treatment is confirmed by 
AAOIFI standards, which prefer to consider restricted investment accounts as off-balance 
sheet items, since the financial institution has no unconditional right to use or dispose of 
these funds. Investments for RIA depositors are not considered assets of the institution 
(under the assumption that the underlying mudaraba contract is non-participating). 
 
RIA holders would want to be reassured that the financial institution conforms to 
their investment mandates. However, this should not be a major distinctive issue for IIFS. 
First, RIA depositors are normally savvy high net worth investors, whose holdings are 
large enough to induce them to directly monitor the agent’s behavior. Second, disclosure 
                                                 
13Article 4, Iran’s Law for Usury (Interest) Free Banking, www.cbi.ir/simplelist/1457.aspx 
14 In the case of Amana deposits, the authorization must be obtained from the depositor while in qard 
hassan, this is not needed. For more, refer to Ahmad (1997). 6 
 
 
practices for RIA holders can be drawn from the ones in place for fund management in 
BCFS where AAOIFI standards do not apply. RIAs in IIFS are similar to managed 
investments in BCFS.  
 
UIA holders are the third and often most important category of IIFS depositors. 
They are a characteristic feature of Islamic finance, raising a distinctive CG challenge. 
Essentially, it is the asymmetry between the extent of these depositors’ participation in 
bearing the financial institution’s risks and their ability to influence the institution’s 
business conduct. Usually, UIA holders enter into a mudaraba contract with the 
institution.
15  The essence of the contract is that the financial institution manages their 
funds and shares with them returns according to a predetermined ratio. Funds provided by 
the UIA holders are placed in investment pools and profits on investments, if any, are 
distributed at maturity according to the profit and loss sharing (PLS) ratio specified in the 
contract. The UIA holders, and not the financial institution, bear the risk of the 
performance of the investment pool, except for misconduct on the part of the institution.
16 
Thus, UIA holders are stakeholders akin to shareholders. They are principals entrusting 
their resources to an agent, in this case the management of the Islamic financial 
institution. A significant difference, however, is that the agent is appointed by another 
principal, the shareholder. Whereas the latter can influence business conduct through CG 
structures and processes in place, UIA holders do not have any similar channel to express 
their views. Their only option is the withdrawal of their funds, i.e. “exit” from the 
enterprise, when feasible. In short, UIA holders constitute a sui generis category of 
depositors with neither the capital value nor the returns on their deposits ex-ante 
guaranteed in principle. They do not have an institutional “voice” on the conduct of the 
business, and delegate the appointment of their agent to another principal whose interests 
may not always accord with theirs.  
 
                                                 
15 The case of Wakalah UIAs, which are based on an agency relationship with the IIFS earning a flat fee, 
rather than a share of profits, is not considered here.  
16 This risk-sharing feature has led some to argue that UIA are not liabilities for the IIFS and accordingly 
they should not be required to meet the same capital requirements as BCFS. In particular, the credit and 
market risk would fall on depositors, while the bank would only be subject to operational risk.  7 
 
 
The investment decisions in IIFS are controlled by a board of directors that is 
accountable to shareholders whose interests may be at odds with those of UIA holders. In 
particular, the larger the share of profits distributed to such investors, the lower will be 
the dividend payments to shareholders. In principle, this should not constitute a problem, 
given that the allocation of returns is governed by the ratio specified in the mudaraba 
contract.  However, IIFS commingle shareholders and investment funds in common 
pools, which gives the management the leeway to direct resources of influential 
principals to projects with the likelihood of better returns. The incentive may be stronger 
in periods of high growth and profits on investment accounts when shareholder controlled 
management and boards may favor shareholders’ investments.
17 A high degree of 
concentrated ownership in the institution may exacerbate this issue. Commingling also 
impacts other stakeholders. Current account holders could be subsidizing other 
stakeholders with their safekeeping deposits. Likewise, RIA profits can  be transferred to 
the corporate balance sheet.
18  
 
In addition, UIA holders do not have a say in the management and use of reserve 
funds to which they are implicitly required to contribute. IIFS generally put in place 
reserve funds with the stated objective of providing a cushion of resources that can be 
used to weather adverse developments in the investment portfolio.
19 They are considered 
important to deal with competitive pressure from BCFS and other IIFS. Returns to UIA 
holders vary according to the performance of the financial institution. Therefore, UIA 
holders may be induced to transfer their funds to better performing IIFS.  To mitigate 
such a risk, IIFS set up profit equalization reserves and use them in periods of poor 
performance to complement the returns that would be due to these depositors. The funds 
                                                 
17 This is indeed what happened in the case of Ihlas Finas House, which used the impressive growth in the 
deposit base to mask transfers of funds to shareholder, as mentioned in the paper “Corporate Governance: 
Overview of Issues and Options” by the same authors. It is to be noted that the expropriation process could 
also be inverse: in years of poor performance, losses borne by investment accounts may be shifted to other 
stakeholders, including shareholders, to prevent a flight of depositors. This practice, commonly known as 
displacement risk, was adopted by Kuwait Finance House when it was engulfed in the crash of the Souk al 
Manakh. 
18 The prohibition to transfer funds from RIA to the IIFS’ balance sheet is an established practice in some 
jurisdictions. In Bahrain, for instance, the Monetary Agency must give prior approval to such types of 
transfers. 
19 These reserves are generally known as Profit Equalization Reserves (PER) and Investment Risk Reserves 
(IRR). We follow AAOIFI’s definition in Financial Accounting Standard (FAS) 11. 8 
 
 
are fed by retaining earnings of UIA holders in periods of high returns on investment. 
Similar arrangements help the IIFS protect the principal of UIA holders. A special risk 
investment reserve is used for compensating a loss of principal resulting from poor 
investment results.  
 
The use of profit equalization and risk investment funds raises issues pertaining to 
the governance of these funds and the protection of UIA holders’ rights.
20 First and 
foremost, smoothing of returns to these depositors as currently practiced is a significant 
obstacle to transparency. By maintaining a stable return to this category of depositors, 
managers automatically send the signal that the firm is healthy and profitable, while the 
reality may be otherwise. Smoothing of returns therefore introduces a veil of opacity 
between depositors and the firm. This problem is heightened by the limited transparency 
on the use, size and allocation of these funds. An informal survey of 13 IIFS shows that 
of the 4 IIFS that admitted resorting to reserves, only 2 provide information in their 
financial statements and annual reports on the share of funds transferred from or to these 
reserves.
21 Limited disclosure does not provide comfort to UIA holders on their fair 
treatment.  Second, these depositors lack the rights to influence the use of such resources 
and verify the degree of risk of management’s investments. Such reserves are considered 
retained earnings, at least in the AAOIFI definition, and reinvested in profit-bearing 
activities.
22 Third, individual UIA holders may not be able to opt out of their participation 
to the accumulation of these reserves. A UIA holder with a long-term investment 
perspective may find it useful to delegate the inter-temporal allocation of his income to a 
financial intermediary.
23 However, a UIA holder with a high discount rate may be 
negatively affected by the imposition of this practice. Finally, a UIA holder who 
                                                 
20 We are not here concerned with the fact that the existence of such funds may be contrary to the theory of 
Islamic financial intermediation, in that it creates a de facto insurance against market risk.  
21 For the sample used please refer to footnote 54.  The only two banks that disclose use of PER are Bank 
Muamalat and Dubai Islamic Bank. 
22 AAOIFI FAS 16 
23 According to a recent study by Allen and Gale (2004) financial intermediaries appear to be as efficient as 
markets in inter-temporal consumption smoothing. 9 
 
 
withdraws his deposits loses his claim on the accumulated reserves and would be 
practically contributing to the future consumption of other UIA holders.
24 
  IIFS’ stakeholders also include “borrowers”  that need access to financial 
resources to pursue economic activities. IIFS’ mission statements often mention the 
special place they give to contributing to the development of the communities they serve. 
Data on the comparative performance of IIFS in this regard are not yet available. 
However, it is noticeable that many IIFS attach a high importance to preferential policies 
for residents of their local communities. Several IIFS offer vocational training for local 
residents in the form of awards, or traineeships for local school or university students. 
However, further research on the comparative treatment of borrowers by IIFS and BCFS 
is needed.  
 
A last, but equally important, category of stakeholders is that of socially 
vulnerable groups. The emphasis by IIFS on their social role is not uniform. However, 
there is a noticeable consistency in respecting the social obligations of Islamic finance. 
IIFS usually take pride in social services provided as signaled by the disclosure of their 
accomplishments in their annual reports. In our sample of 13 IIFS, we found that all of 
them discharged their almsgiving duties (Zakat) as required by the Shariah from all 
responsible corporate citizens. The majority also provided charitable loans (Qard 
Hassan) to help disadvantaged groups meet social obligations like marriage. Three IIFS 
also conducted charitable activities in the form of competitions, prizes, and awards. 
Activities financed range from the implementation of development and humanitarian 
programs, and the construction of hospitals and mosques, to the financing of education, 
house refurbishments and in-kind donations. In general, it appears that IIFS live up to 
their social goals as claimed in their mission statements. 
                                                 
24 In this regard some banks require customers to waive their rights on these funds. For example, the terms 
and conditions of Islamic Bank of Britain state: “you (the UIAH) authorize us to deduct from net income 
your profit stabilization reserve contribution for payment into the profit stabilization reserve account. Upon 
such deduction you agree that you relinquish any right you may have to the monies in the profit 
stabilization reserve account. (www.islamic-bank.com, last visited April, 18, 2005) 10 
 
 
2. External  Arrangements 
 
Internal CG arrangements are generally reinforced by external ones that set the 
framework governing business activity and provide the information necessary for their 
official and private monitoring. These external arrangements relate to (a) the legal and 
regulatory prudential framework governing IIFS activities, and to (b) the financial 
information infrastructure that permits their monitoring. The development of external CG 
arrangements for IIFS would seem to lag those for their BCFS counterparts.  
a)  Legal and Regulatory Arrangements 
 
One significant issue is what body of legislation and regulation should apply to 
IIFS. To date, three broad approaches have been adopted to provide for the legal and 
regulatory regime that governs IIFS activities. (i) Maintaining the same body of 
legislation and regulation that applies to BCFS, and applying it unchanged to IIFS; (ii) 
maintaining the same body of legislation and regulation, but adapting it through 
interpretation and procedures to accommodate IIFS Shariah compliance requirements; 
and (iii) developing a separate body of legislation and regulation to govern IIFS. Overall, 
it appears that there is a movement towards recognizing the peculiarities of IIFS by 
issuing IIFS specific regulations, as shown by the passing of such regulations in countries 
that have generally promoted the development of IIFS under the umbrella of conventional 
finance rules.








                                                 
25 The most important examples are the passing of Kuwait’s Islamic banking law in 2003; Lebanon’s 2004 
Law for “Establishing Islamic Banks”; and the British authorities’ continuing willingness to adapt rules on 
to the needs of IIFS, as shown in the 2005 revision of taxation rules. In the summer of 2005, it is reported 




Table II - Approaches to the Regulation of IIFS 
Country   Same body of 
regulation 




Separate body of 
regulation 
Bahrain    3   
DIFC     3 
Egypt  3    
Indonesia     3 
Jordan      3 
Kuwait      3 
Lebanon     3 
Malaysia     3 
Pakistan      3 
Saudi Arabia  3    
Philippines     3 
Thailand     3 
Turkey   3    
U.A.E     3 
USA  3    
UK    3   
 
In principle, each of these approaches presents opportunities but also challenges. 
For instance, maintaining a clear body of legislation and regulation applying to all deposit 
taking banking institutions presents the advantage of clarity and familiarity of regulators 
with existing rules. However, rules that have emerged in a conventional finance 
framework may not be suited to the operating principles of Islamic finance.  The premise 
that IIFS function on a PLS principle and do not engage in transactions where interest is 
charged raises questions on the integration of IIFS in conventional regulatory systems. 
Existing rules may have a negative impact on the overall performance of IIFS and 
consequently influence the extent to which they operate on a level playing field with their 
BCFS counterparts. To ensure that IIFS specificities would be accommodated in the 
regulatory and supervisory process, some central banks have set up Islamic banking 
departments or Islamic finance divisions in Securities Commissions entrusted with the 
regulation and supervision of IIFS (Table III).
26  
                                                 




Table III- Regulatory institutions specific to IIFS by country* 
Country  Separate Islamic Banking & 
Takaful Department  at CB 
Separate Islamic Capital Market 
Department within Securities regulator 
Jordan   No No 
Malaysia   3  3 
Sudan  N/A** N/A** 
Bahrain   3  No 
Kuwait  No No 
Pakistan  3  3 
UAE  No No 
Indonesia   3  No 
* Annex IV details the names and powers of these departments/authorities. 
** The entire financial system is Islamic. 
 
 
Legislative and regulatory issues that impact the profitability and stability of IIFS 
may be broadly categorized under rules on taxation, rules on permissible activities, 
stakeholder protection rules, and capital adequacy regulations. As regards taxation, the 
asset-based nature of Islamic finance requires that in a single transaction property may 
change ownership several times. For instance, in Shariah compliant mortgage, the 
property must change hands twice – from seller to bank and from bank to customer. 
Accordingly, a Shariah compliant mortgage involves the payment of two sets of stamp 
duty while a conventional mortgage is subject to a single stamp duty. This is tantamount 
to an additional fee levied on IIFS. This issue has been tackled in several countries but 
has not attracted regulatory attention in others.
27  
 
                                                 
27 In the USA, double stamp duties on Islamic financial instruments may still apply. In the UK, on the 
contrary, the issue has been resolved by the gradual introduction of practical measures to tackle the issue of 
unfair taxation for Islamic financial products. These include relief from double stamp duty for Islamic 
property finance products as well as the simplification of taxation procedures for profits earned by UIAH. 
Until recently, no tax has been imposed on the profits disbursed to UIAH. However, such profits were fully 
taxable in the hands of UIAH. From now on, a small tax comparable to that levied on conventional savings 
accounts will be deducted at source. Accordingly, UIAH won’t have to include profits from their UIA in 
their tax declarations. In countries with separate legislation the issue of taxation is generally addressed. 13 
 
 
Second, some Shariah compliant activities may be incompatible with 
conventional finance regulatory framework. By their nature, IIFS utilize a series of 
transactions that may be prohibited by conventional regulations. For instance, an Islamic 
financial transaction may require that an Islamic financial institution owns property for 
short lapses of time. However, in some countries, deposit-taking institutions are explicitly 
prohibited from investing in moveable or immoveable assets for business purposes.
28 
Similarly, no IIFS transaction must involve interest. However, conventional payment 
systems, or reserve requirement rules may oblige them to do so.
29 Likewise, conventional 
lender-of-last-resort mechanisms may not be deemed to be Shariah compliant.
30 The 
problem can be acute in the case of liquidity management instruments, such as for 
satisfying short-term liquidity needs, because of the non-existence of Islamic secondary 
markets. Some regulators and IIFS have addressed the problem through the establishment 
of the Bahrain-based IIFM and LMC.
31 Nevertheless, it would appear that the majority of 
IIFS still lack access to secondary markets and are forced to maintain unusually high 
levels of liquidity, thus curbing investment opportunities and profits.  
 
Third, rules to protect stakeholders often imply principal amount guarantees in the 
form of deposit protection schemes. Indeed, in most countries, stakeholders may not be 
fully aware of the profit and risk-sharing implications of Shariah compliant investment 
                                                 
28 In countries with established dual financial systems, derogations on ownership of property are usually 
granted to IIFS. For instance, Article 54 of the Banking Law of Jordan (Law No. 28 of 2002) exempts IIFS 
from rules that would otherwise constrain their investments in movable and immovable properties. 
29 For instance, in India a strict interpretation of reserve requirement rules that oblige banks to open 
interest-bearing accounts with the central bank prevents the licensing of IIFS as fully-fledged banks. 
Accordingly, IIFS opt for non-banking statuses that may impose operational limitations on their activities. 
This has repercussion on investors as underlined in section II. In other jurisdictions where IIFS must 
maintain statutory deposits with central regulators, IIFS usually use interest earnings for charitable 
purposes. This is the case of Bahrain-based IIFS. In Malaysia, on the contrary, the deposits with the central 
bank are ex-ante non-interest bearing as provided for by an amendment to the Central Bank Act, 1958 
(Section 37 1c, revised 1994).  
30 In Indonesia, Malaysia and Sudan, central banks have established Shariah-compliant lending facilities. 
For instance, regulation 5/3/2002 on “Short-term Financing Facility for Shariah Banks” allows IIFS 
licensed in Indonesia to overcome short term liquidity shortages by borrowing in Shariah-compliant 
Wadiah certificates. However, in other countries, the issue has not been addressed 
31 The IIFM is sponsored by several regulators and its role is the creation of an active Shariah-compliant 
secondary market. The LMC is a joint private sector initiative (Dubai Islamic Bank, Bahrain Islamic Bank 




32 Guided by concerns on depositor protection, regulators may refuse to treat 
UIA as sui generis deposits, and opt for regulating them as interest bearing deposits, thus 
extending to them the provisions of deposit insurance legislation. Nonetheless, applying 
insurance schemes to what are essentially investment accounts may be unacceptable in 
terms of Shariah prescribed risk-sharing and may altogether induce IIFS to renounce to 
mobilize savings with such an instrument. In practice, some IIFS have addressed this 
issue by licensing UIA as mutual funds. This solution brings UIA under securities 
regulation that meshes with the profit and risk sharing nature of UIA. However, the 
mutual fund product may limit the scope of services IIFS offer their clients.   
Alternatively, UIA may be insured as conventional deposits. This option does 
nevertheless represent a second-best, if unacceptable, solution for Islamic jurists.
33  
 
Finally, due to the distinctiveness of financial instruments used by IIFS, 
conventional Basel risk weighting may not be suited to Islamic banks. For instance, in a 
profit and risk sharing account, credit and market risk would fall normally on the investor 
while operational risk would fall on the IIFS, solely responsible for losses deriving from 
failure to comply with Shariah. Likewise, instruments on the assets side of an Islamic 
financial institution’s balance sheet may be subject to risks that are different from those 
arising in conventional counterparts. To address this deficiency, some countries have 
adopted a capital adequacy calculation that accounts for IIFS specific risks.
34  However, 
it appears that several countries have simply extended the Basel framework to IIFS. This 
latter practice may be contrary to the trend toward risk-based regulation. 
                                                 
32 This does not simply apply to non-Islamic countries. In fact, the case of IFH underscored a general 
unawareness on the non-applicability of conventional deposit insurance to IIFS in Turkey. It also showed 
the risks that such unawareness may result into panic and systemic banking crises. 
33 In the USA, there is at least one UIA facility (University Bank, Ann Arbor, MI) that has been licensed as 
a deposit and insured along Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provisions. The Bank’s SSB has 
certified that the application of insurance was the best possible solution within regulatory constraints. In the 
UK, the FSA has adopted a solution that tries to reconcile depositor protection with risk and profit sharing. 
All UIA are insured as prescribed by the EU Directive on Deposits (94/19/EC). However, if the IIFS incurs 
into losses, the individual UIAH may waive its deposit insurance and voluntarily decide to bear investment 
losses.  
34 Some national regulations are based on AAOIFI’s “Statement on the Purpose & Calculation of the 
Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks”. AAOIFI recommends the inclusion of 50% risk-weighted 
assets of the UIA to cover “fiduciary risk” and “displaced commercial risk”, that are arise in UIA 
operations. However, it does not address the risk peculiarities of IIFS assets side. This problem will be 
resolved by the forthcoming IFSB capital adequacy standard, which will deal with UIA and instruments on 




Generally, a regulatory framework that does not address specific IIFS issues may 
lead Islamic financial institutions to pursue a licensing status (e.g. non-bank) that may not 
correspond to the nature of their activities. It may adversely affect market development 
and stability as well as the institutions’ performance. A careful assessment of the impact 
of the regulatory arrangements governing IIFS is warranted.  
b)  Financial Information Infrastructure 
 
Widely available and affordable financial information supports official and 
private monitoring of financial businesses’ performance.  It promotes transparency and 
supports market discipline, two important ingredients of sound CG. Financial information 
may be particularly important for IIFS due to the private equity nature of UIAs and the 
assumption that UIA holders have more at stake than conventional depositors. UIA 
holders should therefore be interested in directly monitoring IIFS’ performance. 
However, this requires an institutional infrastructure which facilitates the production of 
accurate financial information, the availability of agents that can interpret and 
disseminate it, as well as arrangements to protect its integrity. On all these counts, the 
Islamic financial industry faces challenges. Existing limited infrastructure reduces the 
role that information flows may play in promoting competition and market activities that 
would induce managers to adopt sound CG practices.    
 
Issues such as the protection of information integrity concern both IIFS and 
BCFS. Other issues have a special connotation in the context of Islamic finance and are 
the focus here. For instance, a core component of financial information infrastructure is a 
chart of accounts that businesses would use to organize and produce credible financial 
statements. The accounting profession has gradually developed standards, at the national 
and international levels, generally with official support. An increasing number of 
countries have adopted International Financial Reporting and Accounting Standards 
(IFRS) in the wake of an apparent consensus to promote international convergence. 
However, IFRS are designed for conventional businesses, including BCFS. The nature of 
IIFS products, their practice of setting up reserve funds to smooth profit distribution and 16 
 
 
protect the UIA holders’ principal, and the commitment to distribute Zakat are among 
IIFS features that may not directly fit into the IFRS framework. This realization has led to 
the establishment in the early nineties of AAOIFI that gradually developed standards 
dealing with IIFS specificities.
35 While progress has been achieved with AAOIFI’s work, 
the accounting pillar of the financial information infrastructure for IIFS continues to 
present two sets of weaknesses. Wherever IFRS are the only rule, they may not induce 
the production of financial statements reflecting IIFS’ genuine performance and may give 
a false sense of reliability. AAOIFI standards, on the other hand, would be expected to 
deal adequately with IIFS specificities. However, they reduce cross-sector comparability. 
In addition, the direct references to religion may discourage application in secular 
countries. A review of 13 auditors’ reports confirms that practices vary across countries. 
In particular, only 7 of the 13 sampled IIFS utilize some form of IIFS specific standards. 
Table IV shows which countries have issued standards based on, or inspired by, 
AAOIFI’s work. 
 
                                                 
35 AAOIFI's standards are mandatory for the following markets: Bahrain, Jordan, Sudan, Qatar, and Dubai 
International Financial Center. Syria is considering their adoption.  The standards are used as guidelines in 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Malaysia, Lebanon, and Indonesia. Most Islamic banks’ Shariah supervisory 
committees use AAOIFI standards as guidelines.  17 
 
 
Table IV - Country Approaches to Accounting and Auditing Standards for IIFS 
Country   AAOIFI standards (adopted 
adopted/recommended/ adapted) 
or national IIFS specific standards 
Non-IIFS specific standards  
Bahrain  3   
DIFC  3   
Egypt    3 
Indonesia  3   
Jordan   3   
Lebanon  3   
Malaysia  3   
Philippines    3 
Qatar  3   
Saudi Arabia    3*  
Sudan  3   
Syria  3   
Thailand    3 
Turkey     3 
USA    3 
UK    3 
* The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency recommended IIFS to seek guidance from AAOIFI FAS in 
compiling their statements, but officially requires IFRS. 
 
The provision of financial information on IIFS remains constrained by a series of 
issues. First of all, providers, and analysts may not be entirely familiar with the nature of 
IIFS and with AAOIFI standards. However, market forces have already brought about 
substantial progress. For instance, leading international rating agencies now monitor and 
rate IIFS and are acquainted with AAOIFI prescriptions.
36 They have also tailored their 
rating mechanisms to the risk profile of Islamic banks.
37 However, the lack of 
internationally accepted and standardized accountancy practices for IIFS derived from the 
still limited application of AAOIFI’s standards, as pointed out above, reduces 
comparability across markets and banks and may reduce consistency in ratings.   
 
                                                 
36 These are Fitchratings, Capital Intelligence and Moody’s Investors Service. Capital Intelligence was the 
pioneer in rating and analyzing IIFS. It now covers 21 IIFS across 8 countries. 
37 Capital Intelligence uses the same categories to rate IIFS and BCFS, falling namely in 6 areas: regulation 
and supervision, operating environment, franchise strength, management quality, financial fundamentals 
and external support. However, given the nature of IIFS, the analytical focus is adjusted. For instance, 
liquidity risk management may be more important in rating a IIFS than in a BCFS given the lack of 
Shariah-compliant secondary markets.  18 
 
 
These financial information weaknesses do not serve to create a competitive 
environment for IIFS. Instead, they limit the contribution that competition can bring to 
sound IIFS CG.
38   The principal information weakness in IIFS is the limited application 
of internationally accepted standards tailored to IIFS. This has the effect of reducing the 
accuracy of information reported as well as of diminishing comparability across IIFS. In 
addition, it reduces the scope for product competition and diminishes incentives to adopt 
corporate control mechanisms that would minimize costs. Weaknesses in producing and 
analysing financial information do not provide either the means for a fluid merger and 
acquisition activity and hence shelter managers from the threat of takeover in the event  
of poor performance.   
 
                                                 
38 Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) provide evidence that competition has an important complementary effect 
where good CG mechanisms are already in place. 19 
 
 
B. Protecting Stakeholders’ Financial Interests: 
Empowerment and Enabling Regulations 
 
1. Internal  Governance:  Stakeholders’ Empowerment 
 
  The protection of IIFS stakeholders’ financial interests requires the application of 
estasblished CG principles, adapted to the framework of Islamic finance. In addition, 
regulators need to implement solutions that address problems specific to IIFS. First, 
regulators need to focus on transparency requirements, given the limited disclosures that 
characterize IIFS.  Second, mechanisms to ensure protection of minority shareholders   
would seem to be at least as important in IIFS as in BCFS. Third, the practice of 
commingling would need attention as it decreases investors’ confidence in a fair and 
proper use of their funds. Fourth, UIA holders need to be empowered to look after their 
own interests; this may require, among other things, clear and harmonized rules on the 
use of reserves.   
 
Islamic financial institutions generally appear less transparent than their 
conventional counterparts. It is therefore necessary for an Islamic financial institution to 
focus on creating a culture of transparency that protects all investors. Taking the cue from 
the OECD principles, “disseminating information should provide for equal, timely and 
cost-efficient access to relevant information by users”.
39 Thus, an Islamic financial 
institution would need to publish its corporate governance code or policy, and the process 
by which it is implemented.  
 
The particular need to protect the interests of minority shareholders in an Islamic 
financial institution arises out of the concentration of ownership frequently observed in 
such institutions. For instance, in an environment where the largest stockholders are also 
likely to occupy executive positions, CG mechanisms like executive stock options and 
registered shares may be counterproductive for the fair governance of the institution. 
Likewise, relying on the markets for corporate takeovers is not an option when managing 
                                                 
39 OECD (2004) 20 
 
 
families are solidly in control through super-voting shares or majority stakes.
40 In such a 
situation, the ownership structure needs to contain guarantees for minority shareholders, 
such as the attribution of a fixed number of minority directors, or independent safeguards 
in the nomination of outside directors. Alternatively, regulators could consider the 
introduction of remedies that would allow minority owners to sue the ultimate controlling 
shareholders rather than managers.
41  
 
Next, the widely prevalent practice of commingling funds in an Islamic financial 
institution can limit the transparency of the institution’s compliance with its clients’ 
investment objectives. Accordingly, regulatory authorities need to consider rules on 
firewalls and sanctions for breaches. This is of paramount importance in the case of UIA 
holders, whose funds are usually common-pooled with those of shareholders.  
 
Finally, the regulatory framework needs to address UIA holders’ rights and their 
protection. Three alternative options to empowering and protecting UIA holders could be 
considered. One, rights that normally belong to equity-holders can be extended to UIA 
holders. Two, going in the opposite direction, UIA holders could be granted full debt-
holding status and the protection it carries. Three, the sui generis status of UIA holders 
could be maintained, provided that specific governance structures for protecting their 
interests are in place.  Each of these options is discussed below. 
 
On the first option, of extending shareholders’ rights and duties to UIA holders, it 
can be argued that, given the equity-like investment of these depositors, they should be 
on an equal footing with shareholders and thus have the right to elect board 
representatives. This would increase their ability to air their demands and concerns with 
                                                 
40 This does not consider the already limited use of hostile takeovers in banking due to the opacity of the 
system and regulatory restrictions.  In general, the disciplining power of competition is hindered in banking 
by limited product market competition as banks construct long-term relationships with customers. Even if 
product markets were fully competitive, capital markets would still ill-function due to waves of irrational 
optimism and pessimism that result in shareholders looking at immediate revenues rather than the long-
term ability of firms to pay dividends. For more see Levine (2004) and Prowse (1998). 
41 In Canada, for instance, shareholders have a right to apply to courts for relief if any act or omission by 
their corporation or its directors is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the interests of any 
shareholder or if the business or affairs of the corporation are conducted in a manner which has this effect.   21 
 
 
management. It would also satisfy depositors’ demand for greater involvement in the 
strategic management of the bank.
42 
 
However, the election of UIA holders’ representatives may fragment the board of 
directors along conflicting demands of different groups. Operationally, this could lead to 
decisional deadlocks to the detriment of efficient management and profit performance. In 
addition, the extension of shareholders’ rights to UIAH raises a legal issue. This category 
of depositors and shareholders are subject to two very different types of legal liabilities. 
The liability of investment account holders is limited to losses occurring on their 
investments.  On the other hand, the liability of shareholders covers all losses which the 
bank may incur in the course of its business, including  losses from funds provided by 
current account holders. In this light, the power to elect board representatives would give 
UIA holders a role in the strategic management of the entire institution that might not be 
commensurate with their risks.   
 
If extending shareholders’ rights to UIA holders is deemed impractical, 
depositors’ protection could be another option.  In most financial systems, regulators act 
on behalf of debt-holders by requiring insurance on all deposits and taking control away 
from equity holders in case of distress. The PLS nature of investment accounts prevents 
however the application of deposit insurance as it is. Accordingly, a Shariah-compliant 
version of deposit insurance could be put in place. It would cover current account holders 
under all circumstances of bank insolvency and UIA holders only in cases of insolvency 
resulting from proven fraudulent mismanagement.
43 Such a measure may reduce systemic 
risk associated with bank panic behavior and permit redress for UIA holders affected by 
the failure of an Islamic financial institution.
44 
                                                 
42 In a survey of IIFS consumers’ preferences, Chapra and Ahmed (2002) record an interest by depositors to 
be involved in the strategic management of the bank.  
43 In case of bank liquidation, the Central Bank of Jordan distinguishes between investment accounts and 
deposits accounts. While the latter can be covered by deposit insurance, the former are charged with the 
expenses and disbursements of the liquidator and only subsequently their entitlements are distributed 
according to PLS ratios. See Banking Law Art 56. 
44 This is the system that is currently in place in Turkey. As outlined in the paper “Corporate Governance: 
Overview of Issues and Options” by the same authors, it was introduced following the runs on Special 




The objections to deposit protection schemes are well documented in a vast body 
of literature that stresses the moral hazard of deposit insurance as well as the collective 
action implications.
45 The latter point may be especially relevant in the case of IIFS. In 
theory, UIA holders could be considered to have a higher degree of sophistication than 
conventional bank depositors, and therefore be less inclined to leave the monitoring of 
the institution’s performance to others. Thus, deposit protection schemes may prove to be 
a more significant disincentive to oversight of managers’ decisions. More importantly, 
the establishment of protection mechanisms does not guarantee per se an impartial 
conduct of business, because it leaves unchanged those governance structures that would 
permit a shareholder-controlled management to be biased against UIA holders in 
determining investment policies. 
 
A third option would be to put in place new governance structures that cater to the 
specific needs of UIA holders. One possibility is the election of a special representative 
or a body that would act as intermediary and, if necessary, whistle blower. The main 
rationale for such a mechanism would be the creation of a permanent institutional 
channel to facilitate information flows from and to this category of depositors. While 
theoretically feasible, this policy presents drawbacks. In particular, the creation of a new 
agent would bring with it additional agency problems and the risk of multiplying, rather 
than diffusing, the asymmetries of information to which these depositors are subject. 
There is no guarantee that UIA holders would effectively monitor the conduct of their 
representative or that the representative would be immune from opportunistic behavior, 
such as collusion with the units of the institution in charge of appointments and 
remuneration. The creation of a composite body, made up of representatives from several 
parts of the firm, would perhaps reduce the tendency to collusion, on the assumption that 
the different members would check each other’s behavior.  
 
It appears, therefore, that the creation of governance bodies for the protection of 
UIA holders may be a reasonable solution to the immediate problem. Nonetheless, it does 
                                                 
45 For an empirical treatment of this issue, please refer to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) 23 
 
 
not resolve the tension between the debt-holding status of these depositors and the equity 
nature of their investments. Ultimately it would be necessary to find organizational 
solutions that resolve this conflict.
46  
 
In conjunction with mitigating conflicts of interest, regulatory efforts would need 
to emphasize a transparent conduct of business. In this regard, the smoothing of returns to 
UIA holders as currently practiced appears to be a significant obstacle to transparency. 
By maintaining a stable return to this category of depositors, managers could mislead 
them on the institution’s true performance and introduce a veil of opacity between these 
depositors and the institution. In addition the accumulation of PER may be an 
appropriation of resources by the bank, unless the choice to smooth returns is left to the 
investor instead of the institution’s management. Accordingly, where practiced, 
smoothing of returns should be subject to strict requirements. Waivers on resources 
contributed to PER should be eliminated.  
 
Another option is to issue “profit equalization certificates” against PER to UIA 
holders that they could redeem on leaving the financial institution.
47  In all circumstances, 
however, the financial institution should be fully transparent in the use of such funds. 
AAOIFI FAS 11 provides clear principles and guidelines on this issue. In particular, it 
guides IIFS to disclose the shares of actual profits and use of the PER in the returns they 
receive
48. In addition, each Islamic financial institution would need to adopt clear 




                                                 
46 One option is the licensing of UIA as collective investment schemes. 
47 This would imply acceptance by UIAH that they may lose part of their principal if the IIFS has had 
negative profits during the term of their investments. The problem with such a scheme is that UIAH would 
probably extend financing in the hope of future returns. This would be tantamount to a restriction of their 
exit options  
48 Some IIFS have already established the practice of distinguishing between profit distribution and reserve 
distributed. 
49 Decisions pertaining to PER and IIR should ideally be left to the business. However, concerns over 
maintaining the UIAH principal and the systemic consequences that losses may provoke have led some 
regulators to intervene. For instance, the Banking Law of Jordan as amended in 2003 establishes a 
minimum deduction of 10% on earnings to be invested in an investment risk fund in order to cover losses in 
mutual investment accounts. Such minimum deduction may be increased by the CB (Art. 55). 24 
 
 
2.  Strengthening the External Environment  
 
An external environment that takes account of IIFS specificities would enhance 
the soundness of CG at the broader institutional level. Public and private sector activities 
can converge to provide a sound framework for the protection of the financial interests of 
IIFS’ stakeholders.  
 
a)  Flexible Regulatory Approach and Private Initiatives 
 
  As earlier observed, IIFS would require regulatory and legislative solutions that 
differ in certain respects from those governing BCFS.  Regulators would therefore need 
to adapt the underlying institutional and regulatory infrastructure, as well as encourage 
private sector self-regulatory initiatives. Likewise IIFS should consider applying for   
licenses that best suit their needs. Supervisors need to be conversant with the 
arrangements put in place to ensure effective supervision without overburdening IIFS 
operations.  
 
 There  is  no single ideal model of regulation for IIFS. In practice, though,  Islamic 
finance is the most developed in countries which have separate arrangements for Islamic 
financial institutions. This would suggest that application of CG principles in a manner 
that recognizes IIFS specificities and results in an IIFS-specific regulatory infrastructure 
may support sounder CG. A rationale for separate arrangements can also be found in the 
enacting of Islamic finance laws in countries that had previously opted for a homogenous 
regulatory framework as well as by the creation of specialized Islamic finance regulatory 
divisions in the regulatory bodies. Nevertheless, establishing separate laws or institutions 
for the regulation of IIFS could be an issue in non-Islamic countries. Also, IIFS seem to 
flourish even in some countries that did not address the specificities of IIFS through 
specific legislation. This is the case, for instance, in the UK, Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, 
where the lack of an IIFS-specific legal framework does not equate with a neglect of the 
industry. In particular, regulators in these countries have shown willingness to adapt 25 
 
 
regulatory arrangements whenever needed, guided by the imperatives of fair competition, 
systemic stability, and investor protection. 
 
In some situations, private initiatives may play a role when IIFS and regulators 
cannot find workable solutions to address regulatory concerns. For instance, the issue of 
last-resort lending may be addressed by setting up a takaful-like arrangement. Each 
Islamic financial institution would contribute a fixed amount to a Shariah-compliant 
mutual insurance pool and tap from its profits in times of distress.
50 Creating a lending 
facility of this type outside central banks may be desirable in those countries where 
central banks are reluctant to establish separate lending instruments for IIFS. Likewise, in 
the case of liquidity risk, an Islamic financial institution may replicate or reinforce private 
liquidity risk management arrangements along the lines of the LMC.  
 
In those countries, where regulators would not consider adapting their 
arrangements to IIFS, the latter may wish to seek an alternative licensing status that does 
not conflict with the nature of Islamic finance. For example, licensing IIFS as financial 
cooperatives would present CG advantages.
51  However, it would raise other CG issues. 
Furthermore, it may place the IIFS on a non-level playing field with BCFS in those 
countries where legislation restricts the scope of activities by non-banking institutions.  
b)  Enhancing Financial Information Flows 
 
  A comprehensive flow of quality financial information requires the 
standardization and harmonization of accounting and auditing practices for IIFS. 
Accounting standards that permit clear financial reporting by IIFS would enhance 
stakeholders’ confidence, while lowering the costs of information collection would 
induce reputable private agents to extend their operations to the IIFS market. This would 
                                                 
50 This idea echoes Chapra and Ahmed (2002) that propose the set up of a common pool at central banks 
where banks could deposit a percentage of their deposits and borrow interest-free in case of need provided 
that that the net use of this facility is zero. While the ideas are essentially equivalent, creating a private 
takaful-like structure outside central banks may be a more workable solutions for non-Muslim jurisdictions. 
51 For instance, to better manage their liquidity, IIFS could emulate the financial cooperatives’ practice of 
organizing in conglomerates or networks and commit to satisfying each other’s liquidity needs. 26 
 
 
enable synergies between supervisors, market monitors, and rating agencies, thereby 
encouraging sound CG.  
 
A chart of accounts that permits IIFS to provide clear and reliable financial 
reporting is a priority to improve their CG. Significant progress has been achieved by 
AAOIFI in this respect. Adoption of AAOIFI standards, creation of AAOIFI inspired 
national standards, or recommendation of selected AAOIFI standards to integrate existing 
accounting and auditing standards need to be considered in countries with significant 
IIFS presence. AAOIFI’s standards present advantages. First, they are the only existing 
comprehensive source of accounting standards for IIFS. Their periodical review process 
should ensure that up to date  accounting and auditing practices are retained. Second, they 
allow comparability across Islamic banks in different countries, although they may limit 
comparability across IIFS and BCFS.
52 Third, it may be easier for various stakeholders 
involved in Islamic finance to gain familiarity with a single accounting framework 
instead of a multiplicity of national ones. In spite of increased comparability across 
sectors, the simple extension of IFRS or national conventional standards is likely not to 
bring the same clarity, because it may not fully disclose all relevant information.
53  
 
Information reported in a consistent and accurate manner would provide the 
needed inputs to rating agencies, financial media, investment advisors, and CG analysts  
Current progress by rating agencies on covering IIFS augurs well for the future. In the 
short term, public authorities may also play an active role in supplying the infrastructure 
for information sharing, by creating, for instance, public rating agencies, without the 
intention of usurping the private sector role and exclusively where such markets are 
missing. Adequate provision of information also requires authorities to put in place 
enabling norms that allow reputable private agents to access the necessary information 
and respect its integrity. 
                                                 
52 One criticism of AAOIFI standards is that they depart too significantly from the format of IFRS. 
However, thanks to the ongoing review process, one may envisage a progressive adaptation of AAOIFI 
standards to the general IFRS format.  
53 When AAOIFI standards were issued,  Moody’s observed the following to convey the scope of the 
problem: “(…)when reading these standards, the most striking realization is how little is disclosed in the 






Overall, the introduction of new internal and external CG structures, together with 
the reinforcement of existing ones, can provide stakeholders with sufficient comfort on 
the actions of management and other organs of the financial institution. Internally, this 
requires procedures for the protection of minority shareholders and provisions for 
increased disclosure. In addition, concrete approaches to addressing the problems of 
commingling, UIA holders’ rights, and the utilization of reserves would complete the 
internal CG of IIFS. Externally, recognizing the specificity of IIFS will contribute to the 
stability of the industry and the protection of its stakeholders. Regulators need to be 
flexible and to work with the Islamic financial institutions to fully understand the needs 
of the industry and thereby develop an appropriate regulatory framework. Also, recourse 
to private self-regulatory initiatives may be more important in Islamic finance than in 
BCFS.  In those countries where regulations present constraints on Islamic finance, IIFS 
need to evaluate the available options to determine which licensing status is best tailored 
to their needs and those of their stakeholders. Also, in order to be able to meaningfully 
oversee the institution’s operations, the regulatory and other authorities, as well as market 
participants, would need to have a full understanding of the various nuances of the legal 
and regulatory framework in which the institution operates. The role of  public authorities 
should be further complemented and supported by reputable agents that would send 
signals to market players. This requires the existence of an IIFS specific accounting and 
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Annex I: Glossary of Arabic Terms 
Amana 
(Demand deposits) 
Deposits held at the bank for safekeeping purpose. They are guaranteed in capital value 
and earn no return.  
Fatwa  Legal opinion issued by a qualified scholar on matters of religious belief and practice  
Fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) 
It refers to Islamic jurisprudence that covers all aspects of life: religious, political, social 
and economic. Fiqh is mainly based on interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna (sayings 
and deeds of the prophet).  
Fiqh al-Muamalat  Islamic Commercial Jurisprudence 
Gharar  Literally, : uncertainty, hazard, chance or risk. Technically, sale of a thing which is not 
present at hand; or the sale of a thing whose consequence or outcome is not known; or a 
sale involving risk or hazard in which one does not know whether it will come to be or 
not, such as fish in water or a bird in the air. 
Halal  That which is permissible according to Shariah Law 
Haram   Unlawful according to the Shariah. It indicates transactions which are not permissible 
under Islamic law. 
Hibah  Literally gift. A gift awarded voluntarily in return for a loan. 
Ju’ala 
(Service charge) 
A party pays another a specified amount of money as a fee for rendering a specific 
service in accordance to the terms of the contract stipulated between the two parties. This 
mode usually applies to transactions such as consultations and professional services, 
fund placements and trust services. 
Kifala  It is a pledge given to a creditor that the debtor will pay the debt, fine, or liability. A third 
party becomes surety for the payment of the debt if unpaid by the person originally 
liable. 
Mudaraba 
(Trustee finance contract) 
Rabb -al- mal (capital’s owner) provides the entire capital needed to finance a project 
while the entrepreneur offers his labor and expertise. Profits are shared between them at 
a certain fixed ratio, whereas financial losses are exclusively borne by rabb-al-mal. The 
liability of the entrepreneur is limited only to his time and effort. 
Murabaha 
(Mark–up financing) 
The seller informs the buyer of his cost of acquiring or producing a specified product. 





The bank enters into an equity partnership agreement with one or more partners to jointly 
finance an investment project. Profits (and losses) are shared strictly in relation to the 
respective capital contributions. 
Qard Hassan 
(Beneficence loans) 
These are zero-return loans that the Qur’an encourages Muslims to make to the needy. 
Banks are allowed to charge borrowers a service fee to cover the administrative expenses 
of handling the loan. The fee should not be related to the loan amount or maturity. 
Quran  Islamic scriptures believed by Muslims to be God's revelation to the Prophet  
Riba’  Literally, an excess or increase. Technically, an increase, which in a loan transaction or 
in exchange of a commodity, accrues to the owner (lender) without giving an equivalent 
counter value or recompense in return to the other party.  
Shariah 
(Islamic Law) 
The Islamic Law extracted from the Qur’an and Sunna (sayings and deeds of the 
Prophet). 
Sunna  Deeds of the Prophet 
Takaful  Arabic name for insurance based on Shariah rules. An Islamic Insurance is a collective 
protection scheme. It literally means solidarity. Takaful reflects solidarity and is akin to 
mutual insurance. 
Umma  Community of the faithful within Islam 
Wadiah  A safe custody contract between the depositor (customer) and the custodian (bank). 30 
 
 
Wikala  An Agency contract which may include in its terms a fee for the agent. Same contract 
can also be used to give a power of attorney to someone to represent another’s interests. 
Zakat  Religious tax to be deducted from wealth to be paid to the needy.  
Compiled from  El-Hawary, Grais, and Iqbal (2004) and the glossary of the IIFM website (www.iifm.net). 
 